It has become almost common place in Indian strategic circles to mention the finding of George Tanham’s India study. Tasked with studying India’s strategic culture, his finding was, there is none. In fairness, while this may apply to modern India, this was not the case in classical India. A number of strategic commentators have since evaluated the question, most notably Col. Anil Athale. Nevertheless, further historical analysis is required. Why has a nation, indeed, civilization so richly endowed and populated, so consistently punched below its weight in ‘recorded’ history? Gandhian Pacifism can only account for the last 70 years. The origin is in fact much deeper.

The problem is, India’s strategic culture has been hamstrung by the Chanakya Hagiography. Today, the historical figure known alternately as Kautilya, Vishnugupta, and Chanakya has become synonymous with strategy, when arguably, his life is antithetical to the concept. Strategem, after all, is not Strategy. And strategy is the art of a general, hence the greek term strategos. While it is true that Kautilya is the author of the Arthasastra, was highly learned, and led a successful coup against Dhana Nanda (installing Chandragupta), much mythologising has also flowed down the Ganga. Per Pandit Chelam:

“According to all the Puranas including the Kaliyuga Raja Vrittanta, Chandragupta is described as the son of Mahapadma Nanda by a Sudra wife named Mura from whom he and his Dynasty took their names. He was, therefore, called Maurya and the dynasty founded by him the Maurya Dynasty. He owed his sovereignity to Chanakya…who not only placed Chandragupta on the throne of Magadha by rooting out the nine Nandas, but trained him up in all the necessary arts and sciences. Chandragupta appears to have been merely a puppet in his hands and no great deeds are attributed to him ” [Age of Sankara Part I, 53]

Chandragupta Maurya was himself a relative of Dhana Nanda. As Pandit Chelam has written here, Maurya’s surname itself is in fact a matronymic. His mother was named Mura, and his father was none other than Mahapadma Nanda. Thus, Chandragupta was himself a Nanda. Furthermore, according to the orthodox Hindu chronology, Chanakya lived circa 1500 BCE. As a result, neither Chanakya nor Chandragupta Maurya had anything to do with driving out Macedonian Greek satraps—that credit goes to another Chandra Gupta.

Most trenchantly however, was that Chanakya was not the first author of the Arthasastra, and was not the inventor of Indian Statecraft. In actuality, there were prior Arthasastras, such as that of Brhaspathi and Narada. The original and proper name of Arthasastra is Rajyasastra, underscoring the conduct of statecraft with Kings. Finally, Mandala Theory and even saama-daana-bheda-danda are not Kautilyan creations, but are mentioned by Bheeshma in the Mahabharata [9, 859], and in Vidhura Niti in general.

Thus, the notion of an all-purpose genius-svengali saving India from vidharmic greek invaders is false and damaging one. It merely invites petty politickers into the arena of kings and ministers. Rasputins more often than not lead to the destruction of moral order rather than the reification of it.  Raja—not Rajaguru—is the head of Hindu society and entrusted with protection of the state and proper conduct of statecraft. Ironically, ministers too are traditionally kshatriya functions—because one must be accountable for theory and practice. As Col. Athale has himself asserted, India must go back to Krishna Niti.

Koota Niti is a Return to Krishna Niti

Sri Krishna is the true originator of India’s strategic culture. Bharatiya Koota Niti in earnest begins with him. Many may argue that Nitisastra, per the author’s own articles, is ancient. True, but Niti (practical principles) and Koota Niti (strategy) are not the same thing. While even a peon can practice street smarts, strategy is the art of generals and kings.  Krishna Niti itself demonstrates this throughout Krishna’s story. Muralidhara’s strategic orientation throughout his life was the single-minded focus on restoration of Dharma by all means necessary.

Dharma Yuddha, therefore, is the proper response to Total War. In Total War, victory is the only morality. Sri Krishna foresaw this, which is why once the enemy broke the rules of the battle (i.e. the unjust killing of Abhimanyu), he employed all means to defeat the Kauravas (i.e. engineering Drona-vadh through the 1 lie). If a vidharmic foreign enemy were to have faced a dharmic army, then setting aside the traditional rules for Indic kings would have been even more justified.

After the Kurukshetra War, all subsequent subcontinental conflict would pale in comparison. While there no doubt would have been strategic thinkers, few would have merited mention alongside Sri Krishna. It is only with the rise (or return?) of the Magadhan Imperial State that we again see strategic thinking writ large. The credit for this goes to the fascinating father-son duo of Bimbisaara and Ajaathashatru. It is here that one sees the tendency to not only defeat and vassalise other kingdoms, but to outright devour them. If the policy of expansion began under Bimbisara, Ajatashatru took it to full fructification.

“The accounts of the reigns of Bimbisaara and Ajaatashatru give evidence of a definite policy, aimed at the control of as much of the course of the Ganges as possible. It seems they were the first Indian kings to conceive the possibility of a far-flung empire.” [10, 47]

The military tenacity of republics was well-known, and long before Rome stood the Republic of Vrjjis. Due to its high sense of civic virtue and civic pride, it became so formidable, even Ajatashatru was circumspect about conquering it. When the Emperor of Magadha sent his Chancellor to ask The Buddha whether it would be advisable to invade the Confederacy of the Vrijis (Vajjians), Licchhavis, and Videhas, the Enlightened One answered as follows:

• (1) ‘So long, Aananda, as the Vajjians hold full and frequent assemblies:
• (2) “So long as they meet together in concord and rise in concord and carry out Vajjian business in concord…
• (3) “So long as they enact nothing not already established, abrogate nothing that has been already enacted and act in accordance with the ancient institutions of the Vajjians, as established in former days:
• (4) “So long as they honour and esteem and revere and support the Vajji Elders, and hold it a point of duty to hearken to their words:
• (5) “So long as no women or girls belonging to them are detained among them by force or abduction (i.e., law and not force reigns):
• (6) “So long as they honour and esteem and revere and support the Vajjian Chaityas (sacred monuments)…
• (7) “So long as the rightful protection, defence and support shall be fully provided for the Arhants amongst them…

So long may the Vajjians be expected not to decline but to prosper.’

Hearing this, the Chancellor murmured ‘the Vajjians cannot be overcome by the King of Magadha’. The only possible policy is to create disunion.” [13, 41]

Ajatashatru eventually conquered the Vrjjian republic through his understanding of strategic thinking. His strategy was subversion and his expedient was bheda (dissension). By causing dissension within the ranks of the Vrjjis he was able to conquer the land of the 7707 knights-raja. Thus, long after Sri Krishna, and long before Chanakya, one sees strategic thinking demonstrated by the Kshatriya Sisunaaga Emperors. In actuality, modern generals openly criticise the cookie-cutter frameworks provided by Chanakya that arrest the creativity of field commanders and actual military strategists. [8, 38] Kautilya was certainly a statesman (practicioner of statecraft), but strategist not so much.

Kautilya’s coup itself was first crushed by Dhana Nanda at the Magadhan capital. It was only the combination of foreign troops and an alliance with a dubious outside king that ultimately secured the sishya of this Rajguru the throne. Magadha was already internally riven with rival dynastic contenders—Chandragupta was merely one more Nanda contesting the throne. Ultimate success was due less to overall strategic thinking (as the initial defeats demonstrated), and more due to fortuitous timing and foreign assistance—always a dangerous proposition. Therefore, the time to discard the Chanakyan model has come. A return to Rajadharma verily necessitates this.

Strategy truly was and is the realm of the kshatriya, who is tasked with Rajadharma. Indeed, this reality makes the tendency of later Rajputs to ignore this not only regrettable but disastrous. The enemy, after all, is allowed to defeat a general, but not allowed to surprise him. While Rajputs—with rare exception—were surprised time-and-again by Turkic armies, it is clear ancient Ajatashatru took the time to get information through surveillance and reconnaissance, rather than blunder forth in foolhardy frontal assault—pinning hopes on valour.

“King Ajaatashatru of Magadha, a contemporary of the Buddha, used a new engine of war against the Vajjis, called the Mahasilaakantaga, which must have been a stone-hurling contrivance.” [9, 113]

Magadhan kshatriyas had no compunction about deploying the mahaseelakantaka, thought to be a form of early artillery.  Whether or not this was a breach of traditional chivalry, it nevertheless was a prescient anticipation of the nature of warfare in the Kali Yuga. Chivalry is for cavaliers; strategy is for generals and kings.

Tradition of Koota Niti

Much has been made in recent years about Rajput valour and bravery. While these are not in doubt, there is a clear distinction between Rajput Maryada and the wider practices of Kshatriya Dharma. Southern Armies in Andhra and Karnataka also often featured Chandravanshis and Suryavanshis, and while known for the noble conduct of war, they were not seen as hidebound. The battle of Raichur, for example, featured artillery long before Babur.

If the Mahabharata itself is carefully studied, the braggadocio of hot-blooded hot-heads disappears. Cool and calculating politicians and clear-sighted strategists can clearly be sighted. Closer examination adumbrates that the much ballyhooed bollywood bravado of each man being an army of one is summarily dismissed:

“Without a commander, even a mighty army is routed in battle like a swarm of ants. The intelligence of two persons can never agree. Different commanders, again, are jealous of one another as regards their prowess. O thou of great wisdom, it is heard (by us) that (once on a time) the Brahmanas, raising a standard of Kusa grass, encountered in battle the Kshatriyas of the Haihaya clan endued with immeasurable energy. O grandsire, the Vaisyas and the Sudras followed the Brahmanas, so that all the three orders were on one side, while those bulls among the Kshatriyas were alone on the other.

In the battles, however, that ensued, the three orders repeatedly broke, while the Kshatriyas, though alone, vanquished large army that was opposed to them. Then those best of Brahmanas enquired of the Kshatriyas themselves (as to the cause of this). O grandsire, those that were virtuous among the Kshatriyas returned the true answer to the enquirers, saying, ‘In battle we obey the orders of one person endued with great intelligence, while ye are disunited from one another and act according to your individual understanding.‘” [2, SECTION CLVII The Mahabharata Book 5: Udyoga Parva Kisari Mohan Ganguli]

As seen in this anecdote, even the ancients understood the value of a general and unity of command. Internecine battles from antediluvian eras aside, it is quite clear that Strategy, generalship and war-in-general are responsibilities of Kshatriyas. Disciplined, well-trained, and intelligently led armies will time and again defeat larger ones. This lesson is enunciated even the orthodox Vasistha Dhanurveda:

Parasparaanurakthaa ye yodhaah shaarnga dhanurdharaah |

yuddha-jnaasthuragaarudaasthe jayanthi rano ripun || sl.182

The Warriors even armed with Saarnga bow (made of horn) who co-operate with each other and know battle-craft may beat enemies fighting them on horseback. [5, 141]

Here again, Ajatashatru (whatever his personal drawbacks) showed evidence of strategic thinking. The metropolis of Pataliputra actually owes its origin to him. The fort of Pataligrama was constructed by the Imperial Magadhan as a means to strategically control gangetic commerce. Furthermore, rather than immediately fight multiple forces at once, he prioritised. In contrast to Rana Raj Singh who did not capitalise from mughal discomfiture in the name of chivalry, we see the opposite:

“Ajatashatru of Magadha promptly honoured the memory of this Indian Lear and vowed to avenge his treatment by the Koshalans. But he bided his time, first dealing with another major threat to his kingdom and then benefiting from the chance annihilation of the Koshalan army…Ajatashatru seems to have overrun Koshala, which promptly disappears from the record.” [11, 67]

Perhaps one of the best examples of application of Koota Niti, rather than merely upaaya, is in the Kaakollukiyam. In the Panchatantra, Acharya Vishnusarman himself described the war of Crows and Owls, and used the example of subversion as strategy. Recognising the greater military strength of the Owls, the Crows decided to infiltrate their minister into the ranks of the Owls’ council. This lesson today remains hopelessly lost on internet hindus, who fight over each other to promote videshacharyas. This again, is due to the surfeit of kutopaaya rather than Koota Niti.

What is Koota Niti?

Koota (pronounced “Koota”) literally means “deceitful” or “concealed”.  It is called Kruttik Niti in Shuddh Hindi. The nature of it is in fact far more sophisticated than pseudo-sophisticates claim. It is not merely about concealed attacks or concealed strategems, but even concealed intentions and concealed planning. That is why Sun Tzu stated famously “All warfare is deception”. In recent years, a more precise translation of this verse from the Art of War has been “Victory lies in creating ambiguity in the enemy”—showing the full depth of the concept (and further explaining why Nehru was so surprised in 1962).

“The wise, cool-headed and energetic vijigeeshu [conqueror] should assail upon the enemy by the different methods (of Kootayuddha) on the basis of reports and signals from similarly cool-headed secret agents about the movements of the enemy…Thus the vijigeeshu should always adopt guileful tactics (koota-yuddha) in annihilating his enemy, and by killing the enemy by decep-tion, he will not be transgressing dharma.”—Kaamandaka [6, 412]

Having established that Kautilya was less a strategist and more a statesman, one must also note that there remain elements of strategic planning in the Arthasastra. However, these are more clearly seen in the the Nitisaara of Kaamandaki. If Chanakya was in 1500 BCE, then Kaamandaka was in the 3rd Century CE as per Pandit Chelam.  In the Kaamandakeeyam, it is repeatedly impressed upon rulers and conquerors (vijigeeshu) that cool-headed thinking is required not just for the conduct of statecraft, but for campaigning. A point of value is that he mentions that women should not be in the military camp—a rule that was instituted with great effect by Chhatrapathi Shivaji. Even the terrain must be studied and all state weaknesses must be leveraged to destroy or subvert the component elements of a state. [6, 171] Similar consideration is there in defence of a state.

The heart of strategy, therefore, is finding asymmetrical ways to achieve objectives and to defeat (or win over) competitors. The mere warrior takes pride in defeating the enemy’s strength with his strength. But the job of a General, the job of a leader, the job of a strategist, is to identify an enemy’s weaknesses and use it to his advantage. Chivalry is for one’s womenfolk.

After a thousand years, India’s true ruling class no longer has any excuses for claiming surprise at enemy deceptions. A mere soldier is tasked with bravery and obedience. A General is tasked to win. A General is allowed to lose, but he is not allowed to be surprised. If you wish to keep your nose squeaky clean and prioritise your “scholarship” over safeguarding society, kindly vacate the mantriparishad and leave strategy to the professionals. Rajadharma and Koota Niti demand a lifetime of study and an ability to put national interest and saamaanya dharma before personal ambition or svadharma. The Dharma of the Mantri or Senapathi differs from the Dharma of the Purohita or Acharya.

The life of the strategist verily lies in ambiguity, and he must not only be comfortable with uncertainty, but cloak himself and live in it. Evaluate whose society exemplifies moral standards rather than merely preaching, then you will know who is in fact causing Adharma versus fighting Adharma. Above all, a strategist must not only know the value of “Shut up”, but exemplify it. He must not be so silent as to draw suspicion, but speak only went he must and in an innocent manner, while retaining the confidence of his retainers.

Understand the difference between Strategy (Koota Niti) and Strategem (Upaaya). Our glorious and gluttonous gyaanis glut themselves in their self-proclaimed brilliance due to their knowledge and application of strategems and dirty tricks, under the mantle of Kanika Niti. But dirty tricks have their consequences, that is why there is game theory. If you cheat someone today, will he work with you tomorrow?

The point of strategy is not to win at chess, the point of chess is to win at strategy. That is why it is the game of Kings. The favourite excuses of Rajputs of course also fail to fly. After all, when Chanakya himself described Koota Yuddha (the crooked war of crooked niti), how can rules such as “magnanimity to the enemy”, and “do not strike from the back or at night” apply against Turkic invaders who broke all rules of Civilised warfare? Not only Chivalry, but also avenging internal insults and petty pratishodh became part of the Rajput code. But what greater slight could there be than violation of womenfolk? This is why Niti is required, because it helps us prioritise properly…not merely chivalric codes, but Dharmas…especially the Dharmas of Rajas.

This why Koota Niti is required, because this is not the Treta Yuga, and War is no longer a Sacrifice of Warriors nor a mere Clash of Kings. Total War, Poorna Samgraama,  is a state of do-or die, perform-or perish conflict between entire societies and their ethos. Only serious people are fit to lead it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxya41aMXMA

Traditional

Dharma→Rajadharma→Rajaniti→Dhanurveda→Kootaniti→Kanika Niti

Apad- Distressing Times

Dharma→Apad Dharma→Rajadharma→Koota Niti→Rajaniti→Dhanur Veda→ Kanika Niti

That is also why there is not just strategy, but also Grand Strategy.  That is why in the time of Apad Dharma, even Dhanurveda becomes subject to Koota Niti. Rather than the elements of the state and army and immediate political need determining strategy, it is strategy that determines the elements of the state and the immediate political need and armed forces. Immediate political need, after all, is an afterthought when weighed against the survival of the Civilizational state. For all the talk of the much-vaunted Chanakya Niti, what was the end result in the Medieval period, with its countless ‘Chanakyan” mantris?

“The kingdoms of medieval Hindu India, incapable either of empire building or of firm alliances, and maintaining enormous unwieldy armies which were continuously at war, indeed produced their heroes, but they were quite incapable of withstanding the Turks, whose military science was not over-burdened by pedantic theory or ancient tradition”.  [10, 136]

Only Indians, especially those who brag about their IQ’s all the time, are stupid enough to think that helping an open civilizational enemy to beat a local rival is Rajniti. This is neither Rajniti nor Kootaniti, let alone Rajdharma. This is because the gyaani lacks emotional discipline, as his ego is the highest good. In contrast, the Rajarishi considers the good of the common people  as the highest good.

Strategy asks “Given the competitive landscape, what are my short and long term objectives and how do I achieve them?”. The Gyaani cannot do this because the gyaani cannot prioritise anything beyond his own ego. Servile imitation is his specialty.

“One ought particularly to be guarded against servile imitation, which is wrong. And why? Because generals never are placed in situations that are exactly the same.” [12, 49]

From Frederick the Great to Georgy Zhukov and Zhuge Liang to George Kennan, military commanders and strategic thinkers of all shades have been outstanding improvisers. Rather than merely regurgitate pithy bromides, they adapt time-tested principles in modified fashion to new problems. Not only do they have ‘skin-in-the game’, but are very frequently forced to make decisions on-the-fly and under fire—harmonising both tactical and strategic objectives.

A one off ad-hoc solution to a prima facie study of a problem results in “Arming without Aiming”. Improvisation is not mere jugaad. Rather, it is taking existing knowledge and applying for optimal long-term effect, rather than short-term stop-gap measures. Mere rote-recitation and regurgitation of cookie cutter frameworks are fine for armchair acharyas, but what of the field commander and statesman?  Even mastery of Chess alone is no indicator of strategic genius. “To the horror of many chess enthusiasts, the famous German grandmaster Richard Teichmann (1868-1925) declared, “Chess is 99% tactics!””

Tactic is not Strategy, and Strategy is not Strategem. Unfortunately, in our era of chanakyaniti uber alles, this often forgotten. To understand this in traditional terms, one must consider the following. The Rajamandala, Circle of Kings, is the strategic space. The Saptaanga are the 7 state elements (King, Ministers, Army, Forts, Mines, Allies, People),  the Shadgunya are the 6 Policies (Peace, War, Campaign, Duplicity, Surrender, Inaction), and the Saptopaya are the expedients/approaches (dialogue, gifts, dissension, force, trickery, illusion, indifference).  The 7 elements can be utilised in the 6 policies which are actualised by the 7 approaches—the evaluation of which is determined by strategy.

Rather than mere transaction or impulsive reaction, strategy is a deeply deliberated spectrum of comparing, envisioning, aiming, planning, implementing, and adjusting.

Crows & Owls, lesson in politics, art of duplicity, #Panchatantra
Courtesy @amarchitrkatha pic.twitter.com/kR95uIFLb4

— Ashok 🇮🇳 (@singhak) May 21, 2018

As famously demonstrated in the kaakollukiyam, the strategy was to subvert via infiltration with the aim of sabotage. Subversion is a strategy that Indians ignore to their own peril, as they have long been at the receiving end of this. Ironically, the Kaakollukiyam in the Panchatantra itself recalls the episode in which Sri Krishna placed Shalya in the Kaurava camp, for that very purpose.

It is imperative to understand not only the strategic conditions but the very board and dimensionality in which one is playing. If militaries are constantly seeking to fight the last war, Indian armchair chanakyas are constantly seeking to force-fit reality into their framework. Received wisdom alone cannot carry the day. That is why strategy, at its core, is about seeking asymmetric advantages to competitive problems. While China is perfecting ‘acupuncture warfare’ seeking to pierce key enemy weaknesses, Indians are still fixated on fighting Pakistan with izzat and mardangi. “While George Tanham used the elite as a benchmark for evaluating strategic culture”, armchair chanakyas whine about the masses. For all the talk of india’s masses, it is India’s elite and social media elite-in-waiting that is truly abysmal. Self-serving, self-adulating IQ obsessed court eunuchs are a recipe in strategic disaster.

 the top level of British brains and experience in the 1930s.”Their I.Q.’s were much higher than usual among political bosses. Why were they such a disaster?“…”They would not listen to warnings because they did not wish to hear.” [7,18]

Even more pathetic are the blockheads passing for a putative ruling class, that have yet to emerge from the shadows of these svengalis. Until they both come out of their habitual groupthink and engage with reality, until both the traditional and the modern operate in cohesion, until there is consonance between theory and practice, plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.

Conclusion: The Importance of Strategic Thinking

Strategy is about knowing the difference between a friend, a neutral, a rival, an adversary, and an enemy. It is about focusing on puppet-masters rather than obsessing over puppets. It is about anticipating what others may do and planning accordingly—as well as having a back up plan. It is about calculating one’s interests, determining how to achieve them, and evaluating how others may respond. It is about understanding the difference between winning a battle and winning a war, and about learning how to avoid winning today but losing tomorrow. It is about differentiating between short term, medium term, and long term and acting accordingly. It is about pondering over sustainability of action and balance of power. It is about adapting to your environment and consistently optimising results based upon not only a balance of power and a balance of interests, but also a balance of considerations.

Strategy is about identifying your core competencies and acting accordingly. It is about identifying strengths and improving them, recognising weaknesses and minimising them,  verifying opportunities and acting on them, and studying threats and responding to them. It is a balance of blut und eisen logic as well as Carthaginian creativity. Rather than about reaction, it is about carefully considered, multi-step action. Above all, it is about studying potential competitors before the actual competition begins. Rather than jumping into any situations with guns-blazing, it is about recognising that is ok to live to fight another day.  True manliness is not in bravado, but in the will to resist and fight both militarily and intellectually for what is right.

A general can be neither a blockhead nor an Intellectual-Yet-Idiot, but rather must be a person who can envision, implement, and also be accountable. He is one who recognises both art and science, and sees strategy as the blending of the two.

“To be considered a great general, the prerequisite, usually is, if not uniform success, then, at the very least, eventual success. The test of a gen-eral’s greatness is that he overcomes handicaps to achieve his goal. He moulds the circumstances and even turns weaknesses into strengths.” [8, 856]

Strategic thinking is incumbent upon Indians now more than ever before. Habituated to the hoary [pun intended] practices of the License-Permit-Quota-Raj (ye hallowed Valhalla of Babudom) bureaucratic babus have constrained commanders and kanzlers alike with contradictory policies and protocols. Indeed, India has become the land of protocol droids, where ritually ordained protocol itself becomes sanctified with the imprimatur of a prima donna punditry. But strategy necessitates a harmonising of diplomatic, economic, political, military, and even cultural policy with strategic policy. It is precisely why even corporate behemoths traditionally featured various functions guided by General Management.

The great irony of strategic thinking, or lack thereof, in Modern India is the obligatory reality of it in the Corporate Sector. From Corporate Strategy to Corporate Social Responsibility, Indian corporate are some of the sharpest strategic minds in the world of business and entrepreneurship. How utterly tragic, therefore, that this same mindset is not brought in earnest to defending not only the national interest, but to preserving and restoring Dharma itself. What is apparently acceptable in the name of private financial interest is somehow anathema for the national strategic interest—or so our Charvaka Panditas tell us.

Ironically, the self-same, self-adulating soothsayers garbed in Gandhian garb, prescribe “Gandhian satyagraha” and selective citation of Rajadharma; they behave as though single-minded pursuit of Dharmic interest will somehow be “Adharma!”. But when fighting Adharmis and Vidharmis, as Sri Krishna showed, all means necessary could be deployed in Dharmayuddha. Rather than brutality and criminality being the motivating factors, necessity was, and only a master of both Dharma & Niti would understand the fine balance.

Criminals and Barbarians look for any excuse to break the rules in the name of expedience. In contrast, Guardians of Civilization only even consider an infraction if necessity necessitates it. The Dharmatman fights war to restore Dharma, the Adharmi fights war in spite of Dharma, and the Vidharmi fights war to spite Dharma. When the stakes are so high, why must the Dharmatman use the traditional playbook? According to Gopala, a good king knows the difference, evaluates the enemy, and fights accordingly. Of course, the question arises, what then is the difference between a good and bad king? When we stare into the abyss, does it not stares back at us? If we break the rules of warfare, how are we any better than those who already do?  But this is the danger of “men-of-conscience”.

In fact, there is a saying Bulgaria, which frequently fought brutal wars with the brutal Ottoman turks. It is that “To be a really good person, you have to be prepared to do a little bad.” Meaning, to be really good, to become truly selfless and do whatever is necessary to protect your society and family, you have to be prepared to break the rules…when the common good necessitates it.  What and how much is a question of Judgment. But recognising this and this need is the difference between a child and an adult. The child only sees black and white, the adult sees greys. The aim of the good adult is to achieve as light a shade of grey as the circumstances permit. So too is it with a good king, who fights the war he must, then when the war is over and righteousness is restored, he can resume acting in harmony with it. That is the Exigency of the Politico-Strategic.

Shivaji Raje, of course, provides an excellent example in understanding how to conduct a Dharmic War in distinctly Adharmic times. Recognising the imperative of Apad Dharma, he first and foremost adjusted his tactics (openly adapting ganimi kava: enemy tactics). Second, he did not care to be a Satya Harishchandra, never telling a lie or honouring every promise to enemies or “allies”. He understood that when fighting people whose most famous poet wrote “All’s fair in Love and War”, you must adapt accordingly. However, Shivaji observed certain rules of Dharma: He protected women (even sending back enemy women with honour), avoided wanton slaughter of non-combatants, and conducted his personal life with Dharma. That is a Dharmic King in the Kali Age.

Raiding and pillaging is considered a violation of traditional Achara-yuddha (war among Dharmic Kings). But if the only way to stop a raid is to counter-raid, can a Dharmic king be blamed?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcrbESEvXfI

Sri Krishna sought to become a Shanti Duta not because he was an “apostle of peace”, but because he wanted to win the PR war. Demonstrating the unreasonableness of Duryodhana was part of his PR strategy to win allies and establish the Pandavas’ cause as dharmic. Thus war and battle strategy were aligned with political and pr strategy and ultimately, the overall strategy of having the most righteous rulers gain the throne.

Those who demand “Lead from the front!” and “Mardangi!”, should understand that Lead from the Front may be a morale boost, but it is not the be-all-and-end-all of a strategic leader. As for the costs of lead from the front, consider Exhibit A: Raja Dahir, Exhibit B: Prithviraj Chauhan, Exhibit C: Hemu.

So it is with conflict. All pieces exist to protect the King, and the King, ultimately the state. Lead from the front gains respect in the initial years, but is a likely way to lose in the later ones. Judge leaders by their commitment, effectiveness, and sacrifice, not whether you see them at the front and at a sniper’s mercy. It is not just Defence-in-Depth (employed by Maharana Pratap) but also Depth in leadership and succession planning that are essential in this age. This is Niti. And more importantly, this is Koota Niti.

The difference, in the end, between a Dharmic and Adharmic king employing Koota-yuddha, is that the Dharmic king seeks to return to normal Prakaasa-yuddha (Achara-yuddha), when the barbarian is eliminated. For the Adharmic king, koota-yuddha, or deceptive war, is the norm, since for Adharmic and Vidharmic rakshasas, Asura-yuddha is a way of life. That is why motivations matter. That is the difference between Kautilya and an Amatya Rakshasa, or more correctly, between Krishna and a Rakshasa.

And that is the nature of Strategy. Ambiguity is at its heart. Ends often do Justify the Means. Niti and Dharma help us understand why to fight, but Apad Dharma and Koota Niti help us understand how to fight and how to make sure we sharpen our elbows, but don’t become the beast we are tasked with fighting.

“No one is decrying the sanctity of the Vedas and the Shastras but it must be pointed out that if we continue to hark back to the glory and continued relevance of the past, particular in matters of national security, we are bound to be found wanting and vulnerable to more modern and better systems which are continuously being upgraded and replaced. We have suffered before, on more than one occasion, and let us not keep repeating our mistakes in the realm of national security because the the price to pay is much too high…

It has been aptly remarked that at the outbreak of each war armies are well prepared to fight the last war. The re-sult is that the side better trained and equipped to fight the new war wins.” [8, 860]

References:

1. The Ramayana
2. The Mahabharata
3. Vidura Niti
4. Sukra Niti
5. Ray, Purnima. Vasishta’s Dhanurveda Samhita. Delhi: J.P.Publishing House. 2014
6. Mitra, Rajendralala & Sisir Kumar Mitra. The Nitisara or The Elements of Polity.Kolkata: The Asiatic Society. 2008
7. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media.  Oxon, UK: Routledge Classics. 2005
8. Singh, G.S. (Gen.). A Military History of Medieval India. Delhi: Vision Books. 2003
9. Singh, Sarva Daman. Ancient Indian Warfare. Delhi: MLBD. 1997
10. Basham, A.L. The Wonder that was India. Delhi: Rupa & Co. 1999
11. Keay, John. India: A History. New York: Grove Press. 2000
12. Luvaas, Jay. Frederick the Great on The Art of War. New York: Da Capo Press. 1999
13. Jaiswal, K.P. Hindu Polity. Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan. 2005
14. Kota, Venkatachalam Pandit (Pakaayaji).The Plot in Indian Chronology. Vijayawada: Arya Vijnana. 1953. p.48-49.